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June 23, 1953 
Promt Jay W. Forrester 
Subject: Bomarc Meeting with AFCRC, WADC, and Boeing 
A letter of May 6 from ARDC to AFCRC instructed AFCRC to promptly 
examine the relationship of the Bomarc ground control system to the Transi-
tion System, to see that the performance of the Bomarc system would be 
adequately provided for as economically as possible, and to recommend a 
plan to be followed by the Air Force to provide proper Bomarc control equip-
ment. Recommendations from AFCRC to ARDC are due not later than 1 July 1953* 
A meeting to discuss this subject was held on June 15-18* The meeting on 
June 15 was between Lincoln, APCRC, and WADC. Boeing was present on the 
second and third days. The fourth day was devoted to the WADC representa-
tives meeting with me, later with APCRC, and last with Read of Boeing and me. 
The following persons attended the Tuesday meeting: 
AFCRC 
Chaffee, M. A. 
Dempsey, V. S. 
Gait, 0. T, (Major) 
Greene, John L. 
Marchetti, J. W. 
Schecter, H. 
Smith, W. J. 
WADC 
Chandler, John S. (Lt. Col.) 
Dietrich, Fred A. (Major) 
Johnston, Guy R* (Major) 
Boeing 
Bryant, William H. 
Mock, El l io t V. 
* * W * a w ^ v « • •*- - j p • * w •• V 
Read, R. W. 
Smith, C. R. 
Wood, Lysle A* 
MIT 
Arnow, J. A. 
Everett, Robert R. 
Forrester, Jay W. 
Jeffrey, Richard C. 
Hopkins, Robert C. 
Smulowicz, B. 
Wells, W. I. 
Wieser, C. R. 
Discussions on the f irs t two days were quite general and rambling 
and helped to introduce the people to one another's viewpoints and to define 
the problem. 
The Boeing Airplane Company has a subcontract with Westinghouse 
Electric Company for development of a production prototype (G-20) which 
would be followed by production equipment (G-31). This consists of manual 
target tracking stations, the manual or automatic missile tracking stations, 
the Bomarc course computer, and necessary connections to ground-to-air data 
l inks. 
General Maude, Valley, Harrington, Sherman were present Monday, 
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The following notes on the discussions held during the third day-
summarize the meeting at that time but were reversed by the WADC men between 
the third and fourth days as shown by the attached letter. 
1. For the sake of discussion, the first question was based 
on the assumption (with the understanding that the assumption was not 
necessarily accepted as fact) that the Transition System could control 
the Bomarc without G-20 or G-31. The first question then was: If the 
Transition System can technically do the G-20 job, should G-20 still be 
developed? Produced? 
It was pointed out that the weapon control part of G-31 that 
goes from radar video to data link information will represent about 8 per-
cent of the total cost of the Bomarc program. Everett summarized the pos-
sible reasons for wanting to continue G-20 development, even if the 
Transition System would do the Job, as follows: 
a* As a development back-up or second line of equipment. 
As a subsidiary part of this, the question arises whether a program 
of the magnitude of Bomarc should be fully dependent on an outside 
development such as the Transition System* 
b. Decentralization. Arguments could be advanced for a 
decentralized weapon control system for Bomarc just as these argu-
ments apply to Nike and anti-aircraft, 
c. Autonomy. Although not a part of the proposed Bomarc 
program, it might be that Bomarc installations would be called for 
in areas where Transition System equipment is not to be installed* 
d. Timing. Will G-20 equipment, if necessary for testing, be 
available to Bomarc before Transition System equipment would be 
available? 
e. Testing. It might be that G-20 should be developed for the 
purposes of testing Bomarc units. There seemed to be general agree-
ment that this would not be a principal'reason for developing G-20. 
Adequate testing of single missile flights can be done with the G-12 
equipment, such as is being supplied by the University of Michigan. 
Standby equipments of this type could be built with respect to the 
testing program. The only necessity for G-20 would be to control 
several simultaneous Bomarc flights* 
f. Load on the Transition System. An argument for G-20 equip-
ment might be advanced if it carried a load beyond that which the 
Transition System could handle. It was pointed out that this was not 
a compelling reason since the Transition System can install as much 
computing capacity as is required and can probably do it more 
efficiently than 0-20 type equipment* 
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2 . The second question for discussion was whether or not the G-20 
and Transition System are capable of working together and being compatible 
if i t i s decided that both should ex is t in the same area. I t was agreed 
that in general they are compatible and can cer tainly be made so. I t was 
agreed on Wednesday that Boeing and MIT would work together to determine 
how G-20 and the Transition System could be coordinated i f 0-20 i s used. 
Everett at KIT and Montgomery a t Boeing were appointed as key coordinators 
on this point . 
3 . The next question discussed was whether or not the Transi-
tion System can do the required control job for Bomarc. This was discussed 
at many times during the three days with not enough information to reach 
firm conclusions. Boeing has some calculations showing required track 
accuracy for various types of courses, a l l based on the assumption that a 
f inal interception probabili ty of 9$ percent was to be achieved. I stressed 
the necessity for knowing how these figures change with probabil i ty of suc-
cess, as well as with the other parameters. If probabil i ty of success goes 
down only s l ight ly as errors increase, (and this i s indicated by some of the 
data) Transition System using only SDV data might be good enough. On the 
other hand, i f probabil i ty of interception f a l l s very rapidly with increases 
in errors, there i s substantial question whether e i ther the G-20 system or 
the Transition System with manual fine tracking added wi l l provide adequate 
control . 
Boeing and MIT wil l explore these questions further and wi l l work 
up various tes ts and reexamine available data to give a more useful picture 
of required accuracy. Read at Boeing and Wieser at MIT wi l l coordinate th i s 
phase of the program. 
U. The following are miscellaneous general comments ar is ing 
during par t of the discussion: 
Westinghouse worked from July 1952 to January 1953 preparing a 
proposal. Since January 1953 they have had a contract for th is work. They 
are now working out specifications and boundary conditions for each piece 
of equipment so that individual design groups can go to work. The proposed 
d ig i t a l course computer for G-20 i s specified to be along the l ines of that 
in G-12 which i s now being assembled by the University of Michigan. The 
G-12 model should be complete in three or four months and shipped to Florida 
in five or s ix months. 
For G-20 i t i s not now known how much computer redesign wi l l be 
called for nor who wi l l do i t . Westinghouse proposes to subcontract the 
computer part of the system. Some of the Boeing people expect to get the 
G-20 computer by the f a l l of 195U, but Chandler and others raised the 
question of whether or not the f a l l of 1955 might not be more r e a l i s t i c 
considering that a subcontractor has not yet been f ina l ly picked. 
The G-12 University of Michigan course computer has a 32 b i t word 
length, a three-address order code, 256 words of in te rna l Williams tube 
storage, using para l le l storage access and se r i es -para l l e l ar i thmetic . 
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$» Chandler summarized the meeting as i t stood Wednesday evening 
and suggested the answer t o the Headquarters , ARDC, l e t t e r as follows ( see 
s e c t i o n 6 for r e v e r s a l of recommendation): 
a . Undertake to determine by December 1, 19$3> what must be 
done to the Trans i t i on System to permit i t t o con t ro l Bomarc ( f o r 
example, i f manual f ine t r a ck ing a t the radar s e t were va luab le , 
what would t h i s involve? There are numerous o ther l e s s important 
ques t i ons . ) 
b» By February 1, 195U, compare c o s t , weapon c a p a b i l i t y , time 
of a v a i l a b i l i t y , and pick from these a f i n a l system for the way 
Bomarc i s to be handled. 
c . Continue the p resen t G-20 program u n t i l the above d iscuss ions 
are a r r i ved a t . 
I t was agreed t h a t the i n i t i a t i v e for ca r ry ing out these s t u d i e s 
r e s t s with Boeing. MIT w i l l a s s i s t where poss ib l e and make spec i f i c t e s t s 
to which we agree . These t e s t s w i l l be scheduled when p o s s i b l e , but i t was 
poin ted out t h a t many of them must wai t u n t i l f a l l . Boeing i s r e spons ib le 
for keeping WADC informed on the work they are doing with u s . 
Chandler w i l l i n i t i a t e ac t ion on the p a r t of o ther weapons people 
a t WADC to s i m i l a r l y coordina te t h e i r work with the Trans i t ion System. 
We w i l l undertake to send v o l u n t a r i l y to Boeing such p r in t ed 
information as we be l ieve w i l l be he lp fu l to them. I t was poin ted out t h a t 
the primary and most use fu l source of information would be through d i r e c t 
contact* 
6 . Thursday morning when I a r r i ved a t the of f ice the WADC r e p r e -
sen t a t i ve s were wait ing to d iscuss a proposed r e v e r s a l of t h e i r th inking of 
the day b e f o r e . The a t t ached l e t t e r d ra f t p roposa l covers the l a t e s t a v a i l -
able th ink ing of WADC. 
A meeting i s scheduled for Fr iday, June 26, Building 22 conference 




CC: A. G. H i l l 
G. E . Valley (h copies) 
R. R. E v e r e t t 
C. R. Wieser 
Planning & Control Off. 
res ter 
General R. C. Maude 
J. W. Marchetti 
M. A. Chaffee, AFCRC, through Planning & 
Control Office (3 copies) 
Major G. T. Gai t 
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SUBJECT: Recommendation Pertaining to Lincoln Transition System— 
Bomarc Weapon System Development 
TO: Commanding General 
Air Research and Development Command 
Post Office Box 1395 
Baltimore 3» Maryland 
1 . Reference i s made to your l e t t e r , subject: Revision of 
Command Policy Pertaining to Lincoln Transition System, dated 6 May 1953* 
In reference to Paragraph 5 of c i ted l e t t e r , the recommendation of th i s 
Center i s that the presently planned (G-31) ground weapons control portion 
of the Bomarc Weapon System should be terminated. This recommendation i s 
based on the assumptions tha t : 
a . The Bomarc Weapon System must operate with the Lincoln 
Transition System ADEE in order to allow maximum u t i l i z a t i on of the 
Bomarc Weapon System. 
b . The Air Defense System employing Bomarc Weapon (F-99)» 
consists of surveillance and detection, of data processing and storage, 
of threa t evaluation, of weapon assignment, of weapon control, and of 
the F-99. 
2 . WADC concurs with the above action provided: 
a. That the FSQ-7 be modified to meet the guidance requirements 
of the F-99. The minimum objectives of the guidance modification should 
be to control the Bomarc Weapon as well as the presently planned G-31 
ground weapon control and to optimize, as much as pract icable, weapon 
performance. The FSQ-7 modification objective should be accomplished 
and available for operational use by January 1957* These actions r e -
quire that paragraphs la and b be clearly recognized as being s ign i f i -
cantly important. 
b . That an FSQ-7 be provided as soon as practicable for use 
at the Air Force Missile Test Center as a tes t f a c i l i t y . 
c . That development of fine tracking be continued and phased 
into Transition System as required. 
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The Conference on 26 June 1953 will include WADC, Boeing, Lincoln, 
and AFCRC. 
Purpose of the Meeting; 
1. To determine whether or not the Transition System can 
and will absorb the guidance requirements of Bomarc. 
2. Consider: 
a. Fine tracking development responsibi l i ty 
b . Development of Transmission system to CIC i f fine 
tracking i s required 
c. Possible reorientat ion of Lincoln program to include 
responsibi l i ty for Ground Control environment of 
Bomarc 
d. Recommendations concerning operational requirement 
for autonomous operation of Bomarc. 
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